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Abstract
This paper surveys models of voting on redistribution. Under reasonable assump-
tions, the baseline model produces an equilibrium with the extent of redistributive
taxation chosen by the median income earner; if the median is poorer than average,
redistribution is from rich to poor. Increasing inequality increases redistribution.
However, under di®erent assumptions about the economic environment, redistribu-
tion may not be simply rich to poor, and inequality need not increase redistribution.
Several lines of argument are presented, in particular, political participation, pub-
lic provision of private goods, public pensions, and tax avoidance or evasion. JEL
classi¯cation: D72, O15. Keywords: inequality, redistribution, voting.
11. Introduction
The public sector provides goods and services and redistributes income. Arguably, even the
provision of publicly supplied goods redistributes between individuals, since most of these
goods and services are not ¯nanced by user fees or bene¯t taxes. Hence, understanding
public redistribution is of great importance to public economics. There are basically two
strands of the literature. One is the normative question of how much the state should
redistribute to achieve certain goals of e±ciency or equity (Boadway and Keen, 2000).
The other is the determination of redistribution through the political process.
This paper will selectively survey some political economic models of redistribution. It
will focus on a narrow class of models in order to describe how the literature has dealt
with two basic questions: ¯rst, does redistribution through the political process reduce
inequality, i.e., is it from rich to poor, and second, does increasing inequality increase
redistribution? In so doing, the survey will focus on a narrow part of the literature. In
particular, I concentrate on voting models. Moreover, since the relation between inequality
and redistribution considered here is broad, I will look at `general' transfers (i.e., the
`social welfare state') and disregard more narrowly targeted transfers as typically analysed
in special interest models.1 The survey will be centered on the `Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-
Richard model' (the `RRMR' model for short) and describe various of its descendents and
how they have modi¯ed the basic conclusions of this model.
The paper ¯rst discusses the general political economy of redistribution in the next
section. Here, the RRMR model is embedded in the larger literature on the political
economy of redistribution. The RRMR model is then reviewed in section 3. It also forms
the basis of the extensions presented in the following sections. The RRMR model assumes
that individuals di®er with respect to their productivity which determines their income.
It predicts that redistributive taxation is determined by the median income earner, with
higher income individuals preferring less and lower income earners more taxation. It also
predicts that if the ratio of median to mean income falls, redistribution increases. The
evidence on this hypothesis is mixed, as the brief review in Section 4 will show. This
gives a starting point for looking for alternative models. The aim of the paper is to review
newer theoretical voting models which give predictions that are at variance with those of the
RRMR model.2 These predictions should also be a guide for future empirical work: if these
1See, e.g., Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a survey of these issues.
2See also the survey by Harms and Zink (2003). They focus on limits to redistribution, whereas one
2models have any practical relevance, they may explain why testing the RRMR model has
proved so di±cult. The paper will review those models that rely within the basic RRMR
approach, but modify the economic environment in ways which change the predictions of
the RRMR model. Hence, interest group models and bureaucracy theoretic approaches
will be deliberately disregarded, even though they are surely empirically important.
The rest of the paper will be organised by categories which di®er according to their
redistributional consequences (and also, as will be pointed out as I go along, to the link
between inequality and spending). In Section 5, the RRMR model is extended without
a®ecting the basic conclusion that redistribution is rich to poor and higher inequality
increases spending. However, there are di®erent reasons why social spending might be lim-
ited. Two arguments reviewed are the e®ect of political participation and upward mobility.
However, I also brie°y look at social preferences, which under speci¯c assumptions lead to
more redistribution than predicted by assuming narrowly de¯ned self interest on the part
of voters.
Section 6 then turns the conclusions of the RRMR model on its head. In particular,
here the emphasis is on spending which redistributes from poor to rich. Education is an
oft-cited example. Another example discussed here is insurance.
Section 7 and 8 then turn to so-called `ends against the middle' results. Section 7 starts
with those models, popularised by Epple and Romano (1996b,a), which yield what Stigler
(1970) has called `Director's law' of income redistribution: redistribution from the rich
and poor to the middle class. Here I discuss public provision of private goods and public
pensions. In section 8, ends against the middle equilibria emerge as well, but this time in
the opposite direction: from the middle class to the rich and poor. Instances of this are
again public pensions and tax evasion and avoidance. Finally, the last section o®ers some
concluding comments.
2. The political economy of redistribution
The political economy literature on redistribution is large, too large to be reviewed here.
Instead, I will try to embed the voting models described below in the larger political econ-
omy literature. The main theme is that di®erent groups of individuals can use the political
machinery to redistribute resources towards themselves or their supporters. These groups
theme in the present paper is also that redistribution may not be simply rich to poor.
3may include interest groups and politicians or parties. This section will be necessarily brief
and incomplete, but the purpose here is not to be comprehensive, but rather to shed light
on the way di®erent political actors or institutions shape redistributive outcomes.
2.1. Parties
Voting models assume that government policies are either directly determined by voters,
or that policy outcomes of representative democracies are the same that would be imple-
mented by direct voting. This would hold in a one-dimensional policy space if all voters
have single peaked preferences and two parties compete for votes, where the parties are
motivated solely by the desire of winning o±ce.3 However, if the parties are run by politi-
cians with their own preferences on policies, then policy outcomes will generally depend
on the party in o±ce. In the extreme, when parties compete only once and cannot make
binding commitments to voters, the implemented policy will correspond to the ideal policy
of the party in o±ce (Alesina, 1988).
In general, the `partisan theory' of political competition assumes that left-wing parties
represent lower income voters and right wing parties high income voters. Hence, if a leftist
government is in power, it should opt for higher spending on items which redistribute to
the poor.
There is some support for the partisan theory. For instance, using data for developed
countries, Cusack (1997) ¯nds higher spending with left wing governments, while Hicks
and Swank (1992) ¯nd evidence of higher welfare spending when left-wing governments
are in power. Snyder and Yackovlev (2000) ¯nd that spending on social protection in
the US increases more rapidly when Democrats control the legislature or the Presidency.
There are, however, also studies which do not ¯nd much support for partisan e®ects on
redistributive spending.4
Bartels (2004) ¯nds that in the US, Democratic presidents have produced slightly more
income growth for poor families than for rich families, resulting in a modest decrease in
overall inequality. Republican presidents have produced a great deal more income growth
for rich families than for poor families, resulting in a substantial increase in inequality.
In sum, partisan models of redistribution predicts more redistribution to the poor than
3See, e.g., Mueller (2003) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for an overview of these models.
4See the references cited in Snyder and Yackovlev (2000).
4voter models when left wing governments are in power and less when the right is in power.
There are various other party models which give di®erent predictions. Roemer (1998)
argues that redistribution is limited by party competition. In particular, if voters di®er by
income as well as ideology, leftist parties may propose limited redistribution in order to
attract richer voters who share their ideology (called religion by Roemer).
2.2. Political system
There is a growing literature on `comparative political economy' which examines the ef-
fect of di®erent political institutions on government outcomes, e.g., ¯scal policy in general
and redistribution in particular (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000, for an overview). These
models predict that contrasted with majoritarian elections, systems of proportional repre-
sentations have larger governments and a larger share of spending going to broad based
welfare programs, whereas majoritarian elections lead to more narrowly targeted spending
programs. The intuition is, roughly, that with proportional representation, legislators are
elected in large districts, so to win they need support from a broad based majority, while
in majoritarian elections, legislators need to win the majority of all districts, so spending
will be tilted towards a more narrowly de¯ned base in those districts. Likewise, parliamen-
tary regimes should have larger welfare programmes than presidential regimes. Persson
and Tabellini (2004) ¯nd indeed that welfare spending is signi¯cantly higher in countries
with proportional representation than in those with winner-takes-all elections, but there is
no strong support for the hypothesis of larger welfare spending in parliamentary than in
presidential regimes.
2.3. Interest groups
Since voters are not well informed on political issues, interest groups may tilt redistributive
spending in their favour by exerting pressure, lobbying, or making campaign contributions
to politicians. Recent papers model the interaction between voting and interest group
activity (e.g., Dixit and Londregan, 1998; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). If politicians are
purely o±ce motivated, they will converge on identical policy proposals. However, transfers
will not conform to the wishes of voters, but instead, groups with political clout will receive
larger transfers. In particular, groups which are less motivated by ideology receive higher
transfers. The implications for who bene¯ts from redistribution are discussed below in
5section 6.1.
3. The Romer-Roberts-Meltzer-Richard Model
Generically, equilibria in voting on redistribution may not exist. The simplest example to
demonstrate this is that of the distribution of a ¯xed pie, among three individuals. Let
xi;i = 1;2;3;
P
i xi = 1 be individual i's share of the pie. The problem is two dimensional
and nonexistence of a Condorcet winner is easily demonstrated (see, e.g., Mueller, 2003).
Therefore, the literature has largely studied voting for some given sharing rule. In the
RRMR model and the ensuing literature, the proceeds from a linear tax rate are used
to ¯nance equal per capita grants to all voters. The problem therefore becomes one-
dimensional and su±cient conditions for existence can be derived.
In the model exposed in di®erent versions by Romer (1975), Roberts (1977) and Meltzer
and Richard (1981), there are individuals who are di®erentiated by their ability level,
which is also their wage rate, denoted by µ. The wage rate is distributed according to
the distribution function F(µ) with continuous density f(µ). Individuals have strictly
quasiconcave utility functions de¯ned over consumption, x and leisure, L, u(x;1¡l), where
l is labor and the time endowment is normalized to one. Assume that ux;uL > 0uxx;uLL,
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. Further, assume that consumption is a normal
good. There is a linear income tax on labor income, which is the only source of income.
The proceeds of the tax are used to ¯nance a per capita lump sum grant g. Normality of
consumption implies that, while labour supply may rise or fall with the wage, gross income,
y = µl, is increasing in µ.
In pairwise votes over proposals in one dimensional issue space, an equilibrium can
be shown to exist if preferences satisfy (a) single peakedness or (b) the single crossing
property.5 Since indirect utility is not necessarily concave in t, single peakedness does not
necessarily hold.
However, single crossing does: De¯ne ¾ := dg=dtj¹ V as the slope of an individual in-
di®erence curve in (g;t) space for some utility level ¹ V . Single crossing holds if any two
individuals' indi®erence curves cross at most once. The indirect utility function is
v(µ;t;g) := max
l
u((1 ¡ t)µl + g;1 ¡ l): (1)







Figure 1: Voting equilibrium in the RRMR model.





Since y is increasing in µ, the indi®erence curves of two individuals can cross at most once,
and, hence, the single crossing condition is ful¯lled.
An implication is that a voting equilibrium exists which corresponds to the optimal tax
rate and transfer of the voter with median ability (or, equivalently, median income), µm,
where F(µm) = 1
2. This is most easily demonstrated by considering Figure 1.6
Consider an individual's optimal tax rate and transfer. The individual solves
max
g;t
v(µ;t;g) s.t. g = t¹ y;
6The indi®erence curve are drawn linearly for convenience.
7where ¹ y =
R
µ ydF(µ). An interior optimum for the voter with income y is therefore where
the indi®erence curve is tangent to the budget constraint, or
y = ¹ y + t¹ yt: (3)
The optimum tax rate for a voter with income y is then maxf0;t(y)g, where t(y) =
(y ¡ ¹ y)=yt.
Now consider the optimum tax rate, tm, of the median income earner, ym. By the
de¯nition of ym and the single crossing condition, half of the population have higher income
than ym and therefore steeper indi®erence curves; they prefer a tax rate lower than tm.
The other half have lower income and °atter indi®erence curves and prefer a higher tax
rate. Therefore, tm can not be beaten under pairwise votes.
From equation (3), it follows that the equilibrium tax rate depends on the ratio of
median to mean income, which is a measure of the inequality of the income distribution.
If inequality thus de¯ned increases, redistributive taxation will increase.
The result can be extended to any class of tax schedules which can be ordered un-
ambiguously by progressivity as de¯ned by Lorenz dominance (Gans and Smart, 1996).
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994) further generalise the RRMR
model to a dynamic setting and show that more inequality leads to lower growth through
investment disincentives implied by higher capital taxes.
4. Empirical Evidence
The RRMR model predicts that there will be more redistribution the lower median income
is relative to mean income (the higher is inequality). The evidence on this is, however,
mixed. B¶ enabou (1996) cites ten studies of which nine did not ¯nd evidence consistent
with the RRMR model.
Positive evidence is found, e.g., by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini
(1994), but Perotti (1996) does not ¯nd evidence in support of the model. More recent
evidence is also mixed. Milanovic (2000) uses what what he calls the required data, in
particular, cross country data of factor income distribution, and ¯nds evidence in support
of the RRMR model. Rodriguez (1999b) uses similar data for the US (which, presumably,
are more easily comparable). He ¯nds no evidence for the RRMR model.
There is some evidence that the size of government increases with an extension of the
8franchise, as hypothesized by Meltzer and Richard (1981).7 See, for instance, Husted and
Kenny (1997), Lindert (1996), and Mueller and Stratmann (2002). Husted and Kenny
(1997) estimate separate regressions for welfare and non-welfare spending. For publicly
provided goods, demand rises with lower income only if the income elasticity of demand
is lower (in absolute value) than the price elasticity, which appears not to be the case for
most services. Consequently, Husted and Kenny (1997) ¯nd that extending the franchise
increased welfare spending but had no e®ect on non-welfare spending.
Mayer (n.d.) attempts to estimate the e®ect of inequality on state spending in the US
for di®erent spending categories. She ¯nds that increasing inequality (measured by the Gini
coe±cient) increases overall spending and spending on health care and secondary schooling
while decreasing welfare bene¯ts and spending on post-secondary schooling. This is an
interesting strategy, since, as Mayer (n.d.) rightly mentions, voting models have di®erent
implications for the link between inequality and spending depending to the incidence of
what revenues are spent on. Using a cross-country panel Moene and Wallerstein (2003)
¯nd that wage inequality (the ratio of the 90th to the 10th percentile) reduces spending on
unemployment insurance, active labour market policies, and injury and disability insurance,
whereas inequality is unrelated to spending on pensions and health insurance.
To summarise, the RRMR hypothesis of a link between inequality and the size of the
government has met with mixed empirical evidence. The purpose of this paper is not to
review this evidence in any detail and comment on possible improvements in empirical
strategies or the importance of political institutions (Besley and Case, 2003). Rather, I
will look at models that remain within the RRMR framework and attenuate or change its
conclusions. As one point of departure, I will take the evidence that spending increases
with growing inequality in some but not all spending categories. Hence, it makes sense to
depart from the RRMR model in the modelling of the welfare state. Instead of assuming
that spending on redistribution can be captured in one broad based measure of welfare
transfers, it may make sense to consider di®erent categories of spending. If the e®ect of
inequality di®ers according to which category is considered, there is no reason to believe a
priori that aggregate spending should increase with inequality.
7Meltzer and Richard (1981) also note that their model cannot explain why the decisive voter would
want to extend the franchise since this would make her worse o®. Forces outside the model are needed,
such as the desire to tame social unrest (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000).
95. Rich to Poor (RRMR continued)
In this section, the basic conclusions of the RRMR model will be left intact. That is, I
present models of redistribution from rich to poor with increasing inequality leading to
more redistribution. However, these conclusions will be either attenuated or exacerbated.
The section looks at political participation, social mobility, and social preferences.
5.1. Political Participation
Consider ¯rst the e®ect of political participation on the outcome of political processes.
There is a large economic and political science literature which shows that higher income
individuals are more likely to participate in the political process (Rosenstone and Hansen,
1993). The e®ect of this is studied by B¶ enabou (2000). 8
Consider the model of section 3, with the modi¯cation that political participation is
a function of income. In particular, single crossing holds so the median voter is decisive.
Moreover, richer voters will, other things equal, prefer lower taxes than poorer ones. How-
ever, since not everyone votes, the decisive voter will be the voter with median income
among those who vote, which may di®er from the population median.9 Speci¯cally, fol-
lowing B¶ enabou (2000), assume that political weight is a function of income, ! = f(y).
Furthermore, suppose income is lognormally distributed: lny » N(ym;¾). B¶ enabou (2000)
shows that if ! = y¸, the decisive voter has log income lny¤ = ym + ¸¾. Thus, if ¸ > 0,
i.e., political participation increases with income, the pivotal voter has income above the
median. As a result, redistribution is lower than it would be with full participation.
B¶ enabou uses the model to compute the percentile of the decisive voter in the income
distribution, given data on the political participation of various population groups from
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993).10 For instance, the poorest 16 percent of the income dis-
tribution in the US account for 12.2 percent of the votes and four percent of campaign
8Borck (2002) describes some of the implications of this on the optimal size of jurisdictions, the e®ect
of decentralization on the size of government, and the measurement of congestion.
9Note that the precise prediction of the RRMR model is that the tax rate will depend on the ratio
of the median income among eligible voters to the mean income of taxpayers. However, for reasons of
practicality, empirical studies implicitly assume that the distributions of eligible voters, taxpayers and
total population are identical.
10These computations assume that the political weight is a function not of absolute income, but of a
voter's rank in the distribution.
10contributors, while the richest ¯ve percent account for 6.4 percent of votes and 16.3 per-
cent of contributors. By implication, if voting were the sole means of political in°uence,
the pivotal voter would be at the 55.5th percentile, while if contributions were the only
means of in°uence, it would be the 73.6th percentile. The distribution of political in°u-
ence, therefore, is extremely skewed. Consequently, redistribution will be much lower than
predicted by the RRMR model. Averaging over all political activities would imply a deci-
sive voter with income at about the 65th percentile of the distribution. Since the mean is
at the 63rd percentile, the prediction would be redistribution from poor to rich, since the
decisive voter would have income above the mean.
Rodriguez (1999a) analyzes a model where the median voter is decisive, but redistribu-
tion is limited by the fact that rich capital owners expend more on campaign contributions,
which causes politicians to grant them tax exemptions. These models have the implication
that redistribution need not increase when inequality rises (B¶ enabou, 2000; Rodriguez,
1999a).
5.2. Upward mobility
? among others have argued that some poor individuals may oppose redistribution if they
expect to be rich in the future and if redistribution policies are su±ciently stable. In
their model, it turns out that voters oppose redistribution if future income is an increas-
ing and concave function of today's income. Redistribution is limited by the stability of
voting outcomes, the prospect of upward mobility, and the far-sightedness of voters. An
implication of this model is that high initial inequality does not necessarily imply a lot of
redistribution.
5.3. Social Preferences
The arguments presented so far all point to less redistribution or redistribution to di®erent
individuals in the income distribution than predicted by the RRMR model. But there are
undoubtedly mechanisms which point in the other direction. The one I will point out here
is social preferences. In brief, if individuals care not only about their own welfare but
about the welfare of others as well, then redistribution may be higher than predicted by
the RRMR model, other things being equal. Social preferences may take several forms,
e.g., altruism, reciprocity, or inequality aversion (see Fehr and Schmidt, 2000 for a survey).
11These models lead to di®erent predictions than the RRMR model, not only concerning the
extent of redistribution, but also concerning the link between inequality and redistribution
(see Galasso, 2003). I will brie°y outline the implications of assuming altruism or inequity
aversion as motivation of individual taxpayer-voters.
Suppose for simplicity that an individual i has linear preferences over her own con-
sumption, xi. For expositional simplicity, let there be three classes, poor, middle and rich,
with incomes yP < yM < ¹ y < yR. Let redistribution consist of a lump sum grant, as in the
RRMR model, ¯nanced by a linear income tax with quadratic deadweight costs. Call the
individual altruistic if we can write her preferences as





xj; for j 6= i; (4)
where °i
j is the extent of i's altruism towards j. What are the model's predictions? As-
suming that °i
j = °j for all i, the equilibrium tax rate will be that preferred by the median
income voter. Is that tax rate going to be higher than it would be in the absence of al-
truism? The answer is less obvious than it seems. On the one hand, increasing altruism
increases the equilibrium tax rate proportionately to the term °P(yM ¡ yP), other things
equal, which comes from the altruistic bene¯t implied by redistributing to the poor. On
the other hand, the altruistic cost of taxing the rich decreases the equilibrium tax rate
proportionately to °R(yM ¡ yR). Which e®ect outweighs the other depends on altruistic
preferences towards the rich and poor, and the distance between median and low incomes
on the one hand and median and high incomes on the other.
Consider the e®ect in this model of a mean preserving spread of the distribution, in
particular, suppose that dyR = ¡dyP > 0 = dyM. It is easy to show that this will increase
the median voter's optimal tax rate if and only if °P > °R, which would seem to be the
reasonable assumption. Thus, rising inequality here would increase redistribution even if
mean and median income stay constant.
Second, consider a model of inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Here indi-
vidual i's utility is of the form:










(maxfxi ¡ xj;0g); (5)
where ®i is the marginal disutility of disadvantageous inequality, and ¯i < ®i the marginal
disutility of advantageous inequality. It is assumed that ®i;¯i > 0, ¯i < 1 and ¯i < ®i for
12all i. In words, disadvantageous inequality hurts more than advantageous inequality. Also,
since ¯ < 1, individuals would not want to throw away money in order to prevent being
better o® than others.
Under the assumption that ®i = ® and ¯i = ¯ for all i, the median income earner is
again decisive. Obviously, inequality aversion (in the sense of a rise in either ® or ¯ or
both) increases redistribution in this model: ¯rst, the median voter dislikes being better o®
than the poor, which increases the motive to redistribute towards them, and second, the
median voter dislikes { even more { being worse o® than the rich, which converts the costs
of taxing the rich into a bene¯t.11 Hence, redistribution rises with inequality aversion.
A mean preserving spread also increases redistribution in this model: both the bene¯t
of redistributing to the poor and the bene¯t of taxing the rich increase with the di®erence
between median and poor or rich income.
To summarize, social preferences change the nature of the voting game in two directions.
First, redistribution is likely to be higher than with strictly sel¯sh individuals. This holds
unambiguously with inequality aversion, and also with altruism if altruism towards the
poor is su±ciently stronger than towards the rich. Second, social preferences imply that
the extent of redistribution depends on the income distribution in ways which di®er from
the RRMR model. In particular, in the RRMR model, the income distribution a®ects
redistribution only through the ratio of median to mean income. With social preferences,
redistribution depends on the variance of the distribution even if median income is not
a®ected.
6. Poor to rich
In this section, I consider some models where spending redistributes from poor to rich.
This `perverse' outcome will obtain if individual tax rates increase with income. The rich
will then e®ectively subsidised by the poor. This may be the case, for instance, if for some
reason the tax system is regressive. However, in this section I concentrate on the incidence
of spending for proportional tax systems.
11In fact, inequality aversion is isomorphic to altruism towards the poor and envy towards the rich.
136.1. Public good provision
Before turning to more speci¯c examples, consider public provision of a private good ¯-
nanced by proportional income taxes.12 The basic analysis from the RRMR model is easily
amended to this case. Abstracting from labour supply, preferences are given by u(g;x),
where g is the publicly provided good. It will be assumed that g is a normal good. The
indirect utility function can be written
v(µ;t;g) := max
l
u(g;(1 ¡ t)y): (6)









Equation (7) shows that there are two opposing e®ects of increasing income on the prefer-
ences for spending. First, the tax price of g increases with y, leading to a lower preference
for spending. Second, however, since g is a normal good, richer voters have higher de-
mands, other things equal, so spending would tend to increase with y. It can be shown
that the net e®ect of income on preferred spending is positive if the income elasticity of
demand exceeds the price elasticity (Kenny, 1978).
6.2. Education
Education is an example where it is often alleged that the upper classes bene¯t dispropor-
tionately from public spending. Public ¯nancing of education may then redistribute to the
middle and high income classes.
Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) study voting on education subsidies. A linear income
tax is used to provide subsidies to individuals who acquire an education, and these individ-
uals are assumed to be credit constrained. Thus, even with subsidies, poorer individuals
may not be able to acquire education. Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) show that a voting
equilibrium can exist where subsidies go to the rich and middle class only, with the poor
paying taxes and not obtaining an education. This formalises the intuition that public ed-
ucation ¯nancing may e®ectively subsidize well-to-do classes. There is also evidence which
supports this fact: children from richer families are more likely to obtain higher education,
12Public goods can be treated in exactly the same manner.
14so subsidies to higher education e®ectively involve a transfer to those classes.13
6.3. Insurance
The RRMR model can also be extended to allow for insurance aspects. This extension
is not trivial since part of the welfare state redistributes between individuals ex post, but
from an ex ante perspective, welfare spending may provide insurance to individuals. It is
also apparent that individual risk perceptions now impact the voting outcome. Moene and
Wallerstein (2003) propose the following model. Suppose individuals di®er by their wage,
w, but all face the same probability, 1 ¡¼, of income loss due to illness or unemployment.
Wages are distributed according to a log-normal distribution function. Individuals are risk
averse and have a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
¼u(cE) + (1 ¡ ¼)u(cN);
where u0 > 0 > u00, and cE(cN) is the consumption in the `good' (`bad') state. The
welfare state can provide a general transfer to all individuals, whether or not they are
employed (e.g., health care), or an unemployment bene¯t to those with no income only.14
Expenditures are ¯nanced by a proportional wage tax at rate t.
Moene and Wallerstein (2003) show the following: If the constant coe±cient of relative
risk aversion exceeds 1 (implying that the demand for unemployment insurance rises with
income), the level of unemployment bene¯ts declines with increasing wage inequality. The
reason is that the median voter (whose income falls with rising inequality) now demands
less insurance, and, since the coe±cient of relative risk aversion exceeds 1, this income
e®ect outweighs the price e®ect whereby bene¯ts are obtainable at a lower price since the
median voter's income and therefore her tax share have fallen.15
In the case of universal bene¯ts received regardless of income loss, the bene¯t level
increases with rising inequality if the coe±cient of relative risk aversion is close to one and
decreases when it is su±ciently large. The intuition here is that this sort of programme
13See the studies cited in Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) for evidence on this point.
14They also examine the case where bene¯ts are paid to the employed only, which conceptually corre-
sponds to the RRMR model.
15The reasoning here di®ers somewhat from the standard microeconomic models of insurance demand:
there, the demand for insurance falls with income if absolute risk aversion decreases with income. The
premium in those models is independent of income and paid in both states of the world. Here, the
`premium' is paid in the form of taxes only in the good state and is related to individual income.
15combines redistribution and insurance aspects. When the median voter's income falls, she
will demand less insurance and more redistribution, where the ¯rst e®ect will dominate if
relative risk aversion is su±ciently large.
7. Ends against the middle I: Director's law
7.1. Public Provision of Private Goods
Consider, again, voting on the level of a publicly provided private good such as education,
safety, or health care.16 In contrast to section 6.1, however, suppose that public provision
can be supplemented or substituted by private supply. Epple and Romano (1996a) and
Gouveia (1997) model public provision of private goods when households may supplement
public provision by private purchases. Health services may be a good example. Public
provision is ¯nanced by an income tax. Epple and Romano (1996a) show that an equi-
librium exists with public provision and private supplementary purchases. If the marginal
willingness to pay for health services decreases with income, the median income earner is
decisive.
If, as seems more likely, the marginal willingness to pay rises with income, the decisive
voter has income below the median.17 The intuition is the following: Very rich voters
prefer zero public spending because private market purchases are cheaper for them than
government provision. For all others, the optimal level of publicly provided health care
increases with income. The decisive voter then must have below median income: the
coalition for lower expenditures is made up of low income voters and those high income
voters who prefer zero public spending. This equilibrium is dubbed `ends against the
middle', since the equilibrium spending level redistributes from the ends of the distribution
to the middle.
When public provision cannot be supplemented Stiglitz (1974) showed that preferences
are not single peaked and hence, an equilibrium does not necessarily exist. The reason
16Voting may also be over provision of public goods. For an analysis that derives equilibrium with public
and private provision of public goods, see Epple and Romano (2003).
17Note that single crossing is violated in this case: where individuals use the private alternative, ¾ is
increasing in µ, while it is decreasing where there is no supplementation. However, Epple and Romano
(1996a) assume income to be exogenous. In this case, utility can be shown to be single peaked so that a
Condorcet winner exists.
16is that an individual will choose private education when public spending is below that
level which makes him just indi®erent between public and private schools. In this region,
therefore, utility decreases with public spending. Above that level, however, at least for
some individuals , utility will ¯rst rise with increased spending, so that preferences are not
single peaked and an equilibrium may fail to exist.
Epple and Romano (1996b) also study public provision with private substitutes. Con-
sider the same notation as in section 6.1. Let gp denote an individual's optimal level of
private education, which solves
max
g
u(g;(1 ¡ t)y ¡ pg);
where p is the price of private education. The indi®erence curves in 8g;t) space now have
two parts, depending on whether private or public education is chosen:
¾ =
(
1 if g < ~ g(y)
y ux
ug if g ¸ ~ g(y)
(8)
where ~ g(y) is the level of spending where an individual with income y is just indi®erent
between public and private school. When private education is chosen, indi®erence curves
are vertical since the individual does not bene¯t from public spending but has to pay
taxes. In the region where public education is chosen, the slope of the indi®erence curve
decreases with y under the assumption that the income elasticity of demand exceeds the
price elasticity. In this case, since ~ g(y) increases in y, it can be shown that single crossing
fails and an equilibrium may fail to exist.18 When an equilibrium does exist in this case,
Epple and Romano (1996b) show that either the median income earner is decisive, or
an ends against the middle equilibrium results as just described: the coalition for lower
spending than desired by the decisive voters consists of poor voters with low preferred
education levels and rich voters with high preferred education levels who, however, choose
private schools. The implications are thus similar to those of the previous model.
A similar conclusion is also reached, albeit in a representative democracy model, by
Dixit and Londregan (1998). They use a two-party probabilistic voting model to analyse
redistributive politics. Politicians cater to voters who have both ideological and economic
18In the reverse case, where the income elasticity is less than the price elasticity, single crossing holds
and an equilibrium exists which has the basic properties of the RRMR model: richer individuals have
lower preferred levels of public education.
17incentives. In equilibrium, the net transfers received by socioeconomic groups depends on
their ideological attachment to one of the parties. Dixit and Londregan (1998) argue that
poor voters may be attached to left wing parties and rich voters relatively attached to the
right, while the middle class show no strong loyalty. Therefore, in equilibrium, the middle
class receive large transfers because they are perceived by the parties as swing voters.19
7.2. Public Pensions
Consider now public pension systems. The system is assumed to be of the pay-as-you-go
type, that is, bene¯ts to current pensioners are ¯nanced by the current working population.
This implies an intergenerational redistribution from current workers to pensioners, which
has led several writers to infer that the social insurance budget is too large in a democracy:
the old and those near retirement do not internalize the full costs of the pension system
and therefore vote for an expansion beyond the e±cient size (Browning, 1975).
However, there may also be an intragenerational distribution. Under Bismarckian sys-
tems, bene¯ts are tied to contributions, so there is little redistribution within generations.
This is di®erent, however, under Beveridgean systems where this link is weak. Such a sys-
tem is studied by Persson and Tabellini (2000), who consider an economy made up of three
generations, young, old and middle aged.20 Each generation lives for three periods, works
when young and middle aged, and receives pension bene¯ts when old. The contribution
rate is a °at rate on income: a worker with income y pays ¿y into the pension system. The
system is Beveridgean, however, in that the pension bene¯t per retiree is (1+ n)¿¹ y, where
n is population growth and ¹ y average income.
The implication is that there is intragenerational redistribution. Interests are thus lined
up along two dimensions: age and income. The preferred pension level is higher the older
and poorer the individual. Persson and Tabellini (2000) show that in equilibrium, there is
a pair of decisive voters, one young and one middle aged, where the young decisive voter
has lower income than the middle aged one.21
19There is, however, also a sense in which the poor are generally favoured in redistributive models
using probabilistic voting: since utility is concave in income, the poor respond strongly to transfers and
would therefore, other things equal, receive higher transfers in equilibrium. This motive may, however, be
countered by the political clout of particular groups.
20See also Tabellini (2000).
21It is assumed that population growth is high enough to ensure that pensioners are not in the majority.
18Casamatta et al. (2000) present a model with two generations: workers and pensioners.
In contrast to Persson and Tabellini (2000), however, they ¯nd that under certain assump-
tions, optimal tax rates are increasing in income for workers up to some income level, ~ y,
above which the optimal tax rate is zero (this is because for those with higher income,
the implicit rate of return of the PAYGO system becomes negative). The reason is that
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is assumed to be low, which implies that high
income workers want to transfer a larger share of their income towards the future, since
their rate of return under the PAYGO system is lower. If less than half the population
prefer zero taxes, the equilibrium tax rate is that preferred by a voter with income below
the median, such that middle income voters prefer high taxes and poor and rich voters
prefer low taxes. This is similar to the \ends against the middle" result of Epple and
Romano (1996a,b) mentioned above.22
8. Ends against the middle II
8.1. Pensions again
In Casamatta et al. (2000), optimal contribution rates ¯rst rise with income and then sud-
denly fall to zero when individual income is high enough. More likely, one would think
of optimal tax rates rising or falling continuously with income. The insight that richer
individuals may, over some range, bene¯t more from public pensions than poorer ones is,
however, an interesting one. Borck (2003a) considers a model similar to Casamatta et al.
(2000), with the additional assumption that life expectancy is an increasing function of
income. This is a well documented fact.23 The implication is that even under a Bev-
eridgean system, richer individuals may bene¯t more from pension systems if their longer
life expectancy more than outweighs the higher per period contribution (that is, if the
income elasticity of life expectancy exceeds one). This holds even though the assumption
on preferences guarantees that with homogeneous life expectancy, optimal pension levels
would decrease with income as in Persson and Tabellini (2000). Under a pure Bismarckian
system, the optimal contribution rate increases with income if life expectancy increases
22When the intertemporal rate of substitution is high, optimal tax rates decrease with income and the
coalition of high tax voters consists of pensioners and poor workers.
23See, e.g, Deaton and Paxson (1999) for the US, Attanasio and Emerson (2001) for the UK and Reil-
Held (2000) for Germany.
19with income. The equilibrium tax rate is then that preferred by a low income worker, with
pensioners and high income workers voting for high taxes. Under a Beveridgean system,
optimal contribution rates increase with income if the income elasticity of life expectancy
exceeds one. If the optimal tax rate is a U-shaped function of income, the equilibrium tax
rate is that preferred by a pair of voters. In that case, middle income voters prefer low
taxes while poor and rich voters prefer high taxes, resulting again in an ends against the
middle redistribution. However, redistribution here is from the middle class to the rich
and poor; Director's law is, so to speak, stood on its head.
8.2. Tax Evasion and Avoidance
It is well known that tax evasion or avoidance a®ect the redistributive nature of taxation.
With evasion or avoidance, individuals pay their taxes on declared income, which may
di®er signi¯cantly from true income. If avoidance increases with income, the tax system
will be less redistributive than if everyone reported truthfully. Again, this has implications
for the nature of the voting equilibrium (Borck, 2003b; Roine, 2003).
Borck (2003b) shows that voting on redistribution with tax evasion changes the analysis
from the RRMR model. In the model, individuals are risk neutral and face a penalty for
evasion made up of a ¯xed penalty and a constant surcharge on the evaded tax. Risk
neutrality implies that a voter will evade either all or none of his taxes.24 Hence, for each
voter, there is a unique tax rate where that voter starts evading his entire income, and this
tax rate falls with rising income. Expected tax revenue ¯nances a lump sum grant.
Depending on parameter values, an equilibrium may or may not exist. In one equilib-
rium, only rich voters evade and redistribution is from the middle class to the rich and
poor. The reason is that in the range where only rich evade, they may bene¯t from higher
taxes, if their income is low enough that the expected ¯ne they pay is lower than the grant
received. The poor do not evade but have low enough income that they are subsidized by
the grant even though they pay their full taxes. The middle class, however, do not evade,
and their income is high enough that the tax payment exceeds the transfer.
Again, this equilibrium has an ends against the middle property, but redistribution is
again from the middle class to the poor and rich. Roine (2003) analyzes model with legal
24Roine's paper is very similar. Here individuals are assumed to avoid a given fraction of their income
if they invest a ¯xed amount into avoidance.
20tax avoidance instead of illegal evasion. The population is divided into avoiders and honest
taxpayers, with richer people avoiding and poorer paying taxes. The model's features thus
are very similar.
9. Conclusion
This paper has reviewed voting models of income redistribution. The starting point was
the RRMR model, which has been in°uential in the literature but has failed to garner
convincing empirical evidence in its support. Starting from there, I have presented models
which lead to di®erent predictions. In particular, it may be that redistribution does not
run simply from rich to poor. If political power increases with income, redistribution may
run from poor to rich. The same holds if the government provides goods or services which
disproportionately bene¯t the rich, such as education. Education is also an example where
ends-against-the-middle equilibria can occur when individuals can go to private instead of
public school. In other models, for instance, public pensions or redistribution with tax
evasion, it may be that the ends are also pitted against the middle, but the ends may
actually win the redistributive gain since the middle class pay taxes without receiving
substantial bene¯ts.
To conclude, there are many reasons why the RRMR model does not always receive
support from the data. From this survey, a couple of themes emerge. First, it may be that
the rich use the political machinery more e®ectively or are able to escape the transfer state
through tax evasion so redistribution may not run simply from rich to poor. Second, it
may be that the RRMR hypothesis holds for some transfers, such as cash transfers to the
poor, but for others this is not true since the middle or upper income classes bene¯t more
from certain spending categories such as education. Since most of the spending categories
considered here are relatively broad and important items in industrial democracies, it
would seem possible that aggregating does not lead to a positive link between inequality
and redistribution.
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